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ABSTRACT
Free Software is sometimes considered solely a technical option, but that is a quite limited 
point of view: we suggest, indeed, that Free Software is not merely a technical option, but it 
is, in fact a different working paradigm for the software development community and a 
different model for acquiring (and sharing) resources in the Information Society. This paper 
will discuss this working paradigm and analyse the market and non-market relations that are 
implied by it.
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1. Introduction 
Researchers from different backgrounds have been analysing market and non-market 
relations in different contexts: amongst Stone Age tribes (Sahlins, 1972), amongst the 
Trobriands in Melanesia (Malinowski, 1984) and in the modern industrial society 
(Lapavitsas, 2004), just to name a few examples. These researches, while different in 
many aspects, show how there has been and there still is a strong presence of non-
market relations in different societies. This paper aims to show how a similar 
perspective can be seen in the Information Society context, discussing the role of the 
Free Software movement.
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The Free Software movement advocates the development and use of software that is 
free to use, free to modify and free to redistribute, on both pragmatic (Stallman, 2002) 
and philosophical (Stallman, 2004) grounds. The Free Software movement shares 
many points of contact with the Open Source movement (Perence, 1999), and they are 
often commonly referred together, as FLOSS (Free/Libre and Open Source Software) 
(FLOSS project 2002), FOSS (Free and Open Source Software) (Bollinger, 2003) or 
F/OSS (MIT Open Source Group, 2002).
In this paper we are referring to Free Software, but the discussion applies equally to 
Open Source, as the two terms are, in most cases, interchangeable. 
Free Software is not necessarily gratuitous; freedom to use refers to the freedom to 
run for any purpose, not to price. In some cases, the user may have to pay a price to 
obtain the software: for example, Richard Stallman was charging 150 dollars for the 
first version of Emacs (Stallman, 1988). 
Similarly, some software gives the user the freedom to use and redistribute the 
software, but not to change it and thus it does not qualify as Free Software. This is the 
case, for example, of freeware and shareware (Werbach & Dreben, 2003), that are 
merely royalty-free. 
Noticeable examples of Free Software include the operating system Linux, the web 
server Apache and the office suite OpenOffice.org. 
Research on Free Software has already examined in depth the business models that 
drive its development (Bonaccorsi & Rossi, 2003; Haruvy, Prasad, & Sethi, 2003; 
Hertel, Niedner, & Herrmann, 2003; Lakhani & Wolf, 2003; Lerner & Tirole, 2001; 
Lerner & Tirole, 2002). Some organizations base their business on selling services 
(e.g. IBM, Novell and Sun). For example, often companies sell Linux distributions, that
are based on the customization and integration of existing Free Software. Other 
companies, such as MySQL AB, do business by selling proprietary versions of their 
Free Software, that can be integrated with the proprietary software of their customers, 
while their Free Software version can be integrated with Free Software only. Finally, 
other organizations are supported by users that buy Free Software (e.g. Lsongs or 
PhoneGaim), that can be legally obtained without paying; in this case buying the 
software is mainly a voluntary way of supporting the developers, or a way to avoiding 
the hassle of having to obtain the software in a different way which usually involves 
searching for the software with the use of web search engines, or compiling the 
software from the source code.
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In this paper we aim to analyse Free Software from a different point of view, focusing 
on the market and non-market relations inside the community of users and developers 
of Free Software. 
Some authors, as Raymond (Raymond, 1999), see Free Software mainly from a 
technical, pragmatic point of view, as a way to obtain better software. Others (Victor, 
2003; Moglen, 1999; Benkler, 2002) consider Free Software as the seeds of a different 
kind of Information Society, that goes beyond the classical model of market economy. 
We insert our work in this latter group, trying to extend the discussion with our 
contribution.
The following sections will discuss labour, capital and product and their respective 
role in the production paradigm of Free Software.
2. Labour and Capital
Pure market values, as money-oriented rewards, are often insufficient to motivate 
many workers (Herzberg, Mausner, & Snyderman, 1959): once material needs have 
been met, an increase in the availability of material rewards is no longer sufficient. 
Instead, fulfilment of higher level needs within the hierarchy of needs (Maslow & Lowry, 
1998) is a required to motivate the work force.
This means that esteem and self actualisation needs have to be considered, and that 
the worker cannot be motivated only by monetary means. The Free Software 
community is pervaded by what has been defined as hacker ethics (Levy, 1984), and 
this needs to be considered for motivating the developer. It is important to note that in 
the context of this paper, as in the context of the Free Software community, hacker is 
neutral term referring to skilled software developers. 
The values of passion, freedom, work ethic, money ethic, network ethic, caring and 
creativity, as described by Himanen (2001), pervade the hacker ethics and the Free 
Software developers. Freedom is valued as itself, more than any alternatives values, 
as the hacker ethics refuses to bow to pure market or convenience:
“But just because we are competing with proprietary software on issues of technical 
merit doesn't mean we think people should choose the program for source control 
based on technical qualities alone. That would mean assigning zero value to freedom 
itself. If you value freedom, you will resist the temptation to use a program that takes
away your freedom, whatever technical advantages it may have” (Biancuzzi, 2004).
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Hacker ethics resembles the chieftainship ethics, as described by Malinowsky (1984). 
The chieftain, as the hacker, is linked to his tribe (his community) by duties and 
privileges – he can ask for tributes, in terms of work or resources – but his prestige and 
his ability of claiming work and resources, depend on his contribution to the community. 
Hackers with a good reputation will be able to involve people in their projects (and in 
many projects, a huge amount of developers is required), and people will be honoured 
to be chosen. In exchange, the hackers need to contribute and to demonstrate their 
commitment to the community. The influence of a hacker that does not contribute to the 
community will be effectively reduced. This is similar in other communities, as in the 
scientific community: the scientists with highest status are the ones who have directly 
and indirectly contributed the most to their fields, not those who possess the most 
knowledge. 
On the other hand, Free Software developers (very often) have commercial interests 
in software development. This is true for almost all the important Free Software 
developers, at least at some point of their career. Linus Torvalds, the creator of Linux, 
has been working at Transmeta (a chip manufacturer) for more than 6 years before 
moving to the OSDL lab (a non profit organisation). Guido Van Rossum, the author of 
Python, has been working for several different companies in the past years. Miguel de 
Icaza, the main developer of Gnome, founded his own consultancy company. At the 
same time, Free Software developers work inside a community and most of the product 
of their labour is available to the community. The result is a dual allegiance of 
developers, both to the community and to their companies.
According to Stallman (Laird, n.d.) in the Free Software community there is a moral 
priority of the community on the business. Nevertheless, many companies (including 
corporations like IBM or Novell) support the development of Free Software. The 
interest of corporations is motivated not in the name of ethics, but of market values 
exclusively, and it could not be differently (Bakan, 2004). 
It is clear that the motivations for the support of Free Software are completely 
different for the labour force and for the capital: non-market values from one side (the 
hacker ethics), market values from the other. At the present time, each one needs the 
other and collaboration is the only viable solution to fulfil the self interest of each one: 
companies can hire developers, and they are free to work in the context of a 
community that endorses their values.
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3. Product
Software and its documentation are distributed according to different types of licensing 
conditions. The Free Software community itself is using different licenses (the so-called 
Free Software licenses), according to specific requirements, but they all provide four 
freedoms (to execute, to study, to redistribute, to improve) to the users, as defined by 
the Free Software Foundation (Stallman, 2004). 
Three main licenses are used in the Free Software community: the GPL (GNU Public 
License) (Free Software Foundation, 1991), the LGPL (Lesser General Public License) 
(Free Software Foundation, 1999) and the BSD (Berkeley Software Distribution) 
license (Open Source Initiative, 2005). The GPL requires that the rights that a user 
received with a GPL software must be granted by any program derived or linked to it, 
which means from a practical point of view, that developers including GPL software in 
their projects must release their work under the same conditions. The BSD license 
allows inclusion of the Free Software in proprietary software. The LGPL is used mainly 
by libraries (shared components), and allows to use it in any type of software, but 
requires that any modifications to the software are released under the same conditions.
Free Software licenses do not restrict the user from using Free Software in a non-free 
operating system (for example users can run Firefox, or OpenOffice.org on a non-free 
operating system as Microsoft Vista). Nevertheless, Free Software licenses as the GPL 
or the LGPL can put restrictions on derived works (for example, you cannot alter the 
Linux kernel and release your changes as proprietary software). 
In July 2005, we performed an analysis of the software at SourceForge 
(sourceforge.net), the widest existing repository of Free Software (including at the time 
more than 65,000 Free Software projects) to study the diffusion of the different 
licenses. At that time, we found that nearly 69% of the software included was released 
under the GPL license, 11% under the LGPL and 7% under the BSD license. A 
previous analysis by Wheeler (Wheeler, 2005) showed similar results: in 2003, 71% of 
SourceForge Free Software projects (45,000) were using the GPL, 10% the LGPL and 
7% the BSD license. It needs to be noted that the software can be released (and often 
is) under more than one license and these data refers to software that included the 
GPL as possible license. Furthermore, in Wheeler’s earlier analysis (Wheeler, 2002) of 
Red Hat Linux 7.1 (Red Hat was and still is the most popular Linux vendor) he found 
that nearly 50% of its code was released under the GPL only.
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This analysis shows how around 70% of the developed Free Software is released 
under the GPL, which does not allow to integrate the software into proprietary 
programs, and that an additional 7% can be used in proprietary software but any 
improvements need to be released as Free Software. The implication is that Free 
Software and proprietary technology currently cannot be easily mixed. Users can use 
Free Software and/or proprietary applications, but in the vast majority of cases Free 
Software applications cannot have proprietary components and vice versa. 
The implication is that the Free Software community is creating a niche in which 
market and non-market relations can develop only between members – companies that 
do not develop Free Software cannot use Free Software component, and often are not 
able to market their products to the users of Free Software.
In many cases software developers say that the software is developed “just for fun” 
(Torvalds & Diamond, 2001). As a consequence, Free Software is characterised by a 
precarious usefulness, as addressed by the GPL itself, in clause 11: 
“there is no warranty for the program, to the extent permitted by applicable law. 
[...] parties provide the program 'as is' without warranty of any kind, either 
expressed or implied, including, but not limited to, the implied warranties of 
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose.” 
(Free Software Foundation, 1991). 
Similar clauses are inserted both in the LGPL and in the BSD license.
This strongly supports considering Free Software as permeated with non-marked 
relations. For this aspect (but not for others, as will be discussed in the next section) a 
similitude with the gift is possible. A gift is given and accepted within a loose evidence 
of usefulness, and Free Software is distributed “as is” - and may or may not be useful 
for the user.
Nevertheless, the usefulness of a product is individual, and often it can be maximised, 
in the users of Free Software, by its freedom. 
The usefulness of software, for a user, is strictly linked to the satisfaction of some of 
the needs of a user. A computer game will be useful if it is providing leisure, and a 
business application will be useful if it is suitable for the business processes of its user. 
Free Software is likely to have a very different degree of usefulness for a hacker and 
for a user that does not know how to use and configure a GNU/Linux system. On the 
other hand, its precarious usefulness itself opens the way to market relations: 
companies can provide services, supporting or customising software that by itself might 
not be suitable to the end user.
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4. A different Organization Paradigm 
Free software is often considered an element of a gift economy, where goods and 
services are not traded, but freely given and taken. Gift economies can usually develop 
in the presence of trust or abundance. When based on trust, individuals share the 
certainty of reciprocity and will freely give away their goods, or provide service, 
knowing that they would be able to receive back from the community what needed, at 
due time. Gift economies based on abundance develop when there is no scarcity of 
goods and the social status is determined not by what the individuals’ controls but by 
what is given away.
Eric Raymond is one of the supporters of the view of Free Software as a good 
exchanged using the rules of a gift economy (Raymond, 1999). This perspective is 
based on the idea that software is a non-scarce good that can be easily shared, 
because the cost of replication for software tends to zero and thus “the only available 
measure of competitive success is reputation among one's peers”. 
However, it can be disputed from a number of different angles that Free Software is 
not an element of a not gift economy based on trust nor is it based on abundance.
First of all, it is hard to consider Free Software as an element of a gift economy, 
because a gift requires the property of an inalienable item to be exchanged (Gregory, 
1982), while with Free Software no property is exchanged. Proprietary software can be 
considered as elements of a gift economy, not Free Software.
Moreover, a gift economy is always based on the presumption of reciprocity inside the 
community, sometimes described as a “delayed market exchange”, and there is always 
a penalty for failing. The Free Software production model is, indeed, based on 
reciprocity between users and developers, but of a different kind: it is voluntary, 
delayed and tending to immaterial for the developer.
It is voluntary because it is not obligatory to provide any sort of regard to the author of 
a Free Software that is used. It is possible and recommended to do so, however it is 
not mandatory, and even if you disrespect Free Software, you can use it (as long as 
you respect the license conditions - otherwise you may lose the right to use the 
software). The example of the SCO case (Shankland, 2003) is meaningful: SCO has 
been attacking the GPL for several years, as part of their controversy against Linux
(Galli 2003) but nevertheless this does not imply that they cannot use GPL software 
(they are still using and distributing GPL software in their products).
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The reciprocity is delayed, because the regard is not usually given for the access to 
the software, but after the use of the software itself, if the users appreciate it. The 
developer of software may not get any form of immediate regard for producing Free 
Software. It may happen, in some cases, when Free Software is produced within the 
horizon of a business project; for example Free Software may be commissioned by a 
customer, or may be developed as part of the commitment of an organisation to a Free 
Software project, or may be due for realising a service that is to generate revenues. In 
other situations, the regard will be delayed in time, if and when the use the software will 
grow. To point out the difference, the regard for the production of proprietary software 
is generally monetary and strictly linked to the access to the software itself. While 
software companies may publish demo versions or development versions of software, 
for the full, working software a fee is required in most cases. On the other hand, while 
in a gift economy the regard is linear, in the Free Software model the regard is 
exponential, thanks to the free circulation of the software.
Moreover, the reciprocity is tending to immaterial, because once a user acquires a 
copy of a Free Software, it can be given to any number of other users, and its price 
quickly tends towards zero. In a market economy, the cost of a product is usually 
decomposed as the cost of the product itself and the cost of transfer. Buying in a shop 
a t-shirt has a cost of transfer, that is the cost of shipping the t-shirt from its 
manufacturing location to the shop, and the cost of manufacturing. In a gift economy, a 
product has a value (based on cost of production and cost of transfer), but it is given for 
free, on the basis that the gift will be reciprocated. In the case of Free Software, any 
user that acquires (for a price or for free) a copy of the software can redistribute it, for a 
price or for free. This implies that in most cases the value will quickly tend towards 
zero, and that a immaterial regard may be the only regard that the developer is 
receiving from most users.
When we receive something with a non-market transaction, we do not pay not the 
product nor the transfer in exchange for the good. This is the case of Free Software, 
but as we have seen we are facing non-market relations that do not appear in the 
context of a gift economy.
By contrast with the non-market relations that happen in a gift economy, we can 
define the Free Software community as a socioeconomic system in which the access to 
goods do not require an agreement upon a quid pro quo, reciprocation or regard, but 
obedience to a defined set of rules which define the possible use of the good.
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We can as well foresee how production numbers that tends towards to infinite and a 
common access to non scarce products that can be easily shared would overcome the 
dilemma posed by the capitalist model of production on how to distribute a scarce 
production. Thus, the Free Software model implies a different approach to the scarcity 
of resources and to the diffusion of innovation.
We have already seen how companies have to accept the hacker ethics to be part of 
the Free Software community, not very different from Venetian merchants accepted in 
the Feudal economy. Free Software is not a collateral experiment, or a small 
community, and if we accept that infrastructure is depending from the production 
structure, we may foresee a change in the organisational structures that are involved in 
the development of software, and we may have the seeds for different production 
models for the Information Society.
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